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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsBRYON DALE PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant

No. 18298

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
'~:

This i·s a crirntnal proceeding brought by the State of·.Utah against

Bryon Dale Peterson charging him with having committed one count of Aggravated
Burglary in vi o1ati on of Section 76-6-.203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended and two counts of Aggravated Assault in violation of Section 76-5-103
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a jury trial on December 21 and 22, 1981 in the District
Court in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, the defendant was found guilty
of Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Assault and Assault.

The court pronounced

judgment on January 18, 1982 and sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned in
the Utah State Prison- for 5 years to life for Aggravated Burglary, together
with a $10,000 fine, 0-5 years for Aggravated Assault and 0-6 months in the
Carbon County jail for Assault.
-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the judgment.
rendered at the trial and a ruling remanding the cause to the trial court
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 16, 1981, the defendant was arraigned on two counts
of Aggravated Assault and a jury trial was set for December 21, 1981.

On

Thursday, December 17, 1981, the Hon. Don V. Tibbs, Vi-siting Judge from
the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Utah, phoned counsel for the
defendant (T.5) and advised him that a Motion for Joinder had just been
filed that day by the State of Utah. (Record at p.32)

The Motion sought

to join one Count of Aggravated Burglary from a separate Information with
the two counts of Aggravated Assault which were to be tried on December 21,
1981.

Counsel for defendant expressed his oral objection to the Court and

filed an Objection to Motion for Joinder on December lR,1981. (Record at
p.35).

On the morning of trial the Court granted the Motion for Joinder.

(T.5).

The defendant was then tried for the offense of having burglarized
the dwelling of Sandra Dotson at approximately 6:20-6:30 A.M. on September 1,
1981, and committing an Aggravated Assault on Sandra Dotson and Tammy Dotson
while in the home.
The testimony of witnesses called by the prosecution showed that
Sandra Dotson had a broken leg and was sleeping on the couch in the living
room of her home on September l, 1981 when she awakened at approximately

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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6:30 A.M.

She saw a· bald head coming through the doorway of the kitchen

(T. ll - 13) , and at fi rs·t thought it was her boy friend, Joe Gross, who
had done "things·like that before" and who was bald.(T. 12, ?8)
thought it might be.her ex-~usband, Walter Dotson(T.15,33)

She also

The.man then

sat on her and placed his hands around her throat and struck her in the
face (T.15, 16) .. She responded by slapping, scratching the assailant,
and screaming for her 14 year old daughter, Tammy, who was sleeping in
the basement bedroom. ·(T .18)

She then drifted in and out of consc.i ousness .

several times. (T. 18, 19).
Tammy Dotson testified that she was awakened at 6:30 A.M. by
her ·alarm clock and then heard a scream from her mother.

She immediately

went upstairs and looked into the living room where she saw

someon~

on

top of her mother and assumed it was her mother's boy friend. (T.44, 54)
The assaJlant then grabbed Tammy's wrist and started to choke her .. She
apparently went unconscious momentarily and when she awakened she saw
the assail ant· choking and beating her mother. (T.47)

Tammy then ran next

door to the home of Edward McKinney who then ran to the Dotson ·home.
(T.49, 51)
Edward McKtnney testified that.upon
room he saw someone-bent over Sandy. (T.90)

enterin~

the Dotson living

The assailant then walked

past Mr. McKinney and left the home. (T.93)
Richard Rathers testified that shortly after

6~00

A.M. on

September 1, 1981 he was in his home across the street from the Dotson
home when he heard screams .. (T.99)

He went outside, apparently saw

Tammy Dotson running to the McKinney home (T.100) and then saw someone
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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coming up the driveway of the Dotson home and get into an orange Dodge
van and drive away. (TJOl-103)

He wrote down the license number of the

van and later gave it to the police. (T.104, 105)
Price City Police went to the home of the defendant in Price
at approximately 7:00 A.M. and requested that he go to the Sheriff's
Office with them (T.83) where he was placed under arrest.
'
The defendant claimed the defense of mistaken identity and

called an alibi witness, Mr. Charles Peterson, father of the defendant;
who testified that the defendant arrived home at 5:30 A.M. on September 1,
1981 and went to bed. (T. 150, 155) and was there at 6:00 A.M. fT.160)
Officer Ed Shook testified that the license number of the vehicle seen
leaving the Dotson home did not correspond to the license number of the
defendant's vehicle, Marilyn McKinney also testified that the van seen
leaving the Dotson home had a yellow fender on driver's side.(T. 174)
State's Exhibits No. 2 and 3 which are photos of the Peterson van,
revealed that defendant's vehicle does not have a yellow front

fend~r.

POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF 1 S MOTION FOR JOINDER.

On themorning of the first day of trial the Court granted the
State's Motion to join one count of Aggravated Burglary with the two counts
of Aggravated Assault.

The defendant contends that the joinder of the

offenses.was improper for

th~

reason that the joinder did not afford the

defendant adequate time to properly prepare a defense to a new information
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containing the charge of Aggravated Burglary.

The motion for joinder.

was filed on Thursday,·December 17, 1981, four days before the trial
was to begin on December 21, 1981.

It is also significant to note that

there was a weekend between the above two dates.
The chronology of events is important to defendant's contention
and is set out as follows:
(A)

Orginally two counts of Aggravated Assault and one count

of Aggravated Burglary were filed with the Circuit Court in one
Information and a Preliminary Hearing was held on November 9,
1981. ·At that time the Court dismissed the charge of Aggravated
Burglary and bound the defendant over to the District Court on
·two charges of Aggravated Assault.
(B)
the

The

~efendant

two~charges

was then arraigned .tn the District Court on

of Aggravated Assault·on November 16,1981, and

trial was set to a jury for December 21, l 98l.
(C)

On November 30, 1981, the State of Utah, without notifying

defendant's counsel that a new information had been filed, did
·in fact file a new informaUon in the Circuit Court charging
·,

defendant with the offense of Aggravated Burglary.
( D) Counsel for defendant did not see the new· Information nor
did he know -0f its existence until shortly before th€ defendant
was arraigned on the charge of Aggravated Burglary in the
Circuit Court on December 16, 1981.

At that time the defendant

objected in Circuit Court .to a Preliminary being held on that
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day since neither the defendant nor his counsel were aware
that the Preliminary Hearing would take place on that day.
The circuit Court overruled defendant's objection and ordered
that Preliminary Hearing go forward immediately.
(£}

On Thursday, December 17, 1981, counsel for defendant

received a telephone call from the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
Visiting Judge of Sixth Judicial .District for the State of Utah,
who advised defense counsel that the State had"just.filed a
Motion to join the new Information containing the Aggravated.
Burglary charge with the Information containing the two·. counts
of Aggravated Assault. (Record at p.32) (T.5)

The Court further

informed counsel that he felt inclined to grant the motion.(T.249}
The defendant then filed his Objection to PJaintiff's Motion For
Joinder on December 18, 1981. (Record at p. 35)

On Monday,

Decer.iber 21, 1981 the Court granted the State.'s Motion for Joinder
(T. 5)

The material portions of Section 77-35-9, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended provide as follows:
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment
or information in a separate count for each offense if the offense
charged arise out of a criminal episode as defined in section
76-1-401 ....
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informations
or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants,
if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single
indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if
the prosecustion were under such single indictment or information.
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· .(d~· .If it ap~e~rs that a defendant or the prosecution is·
preJudiced by a Joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a joinder for trial together, the
court shall order an election of separate trials of separate
cou~ts, or.gra~t a sev~rance of defe~d~nt, or §rovide such other
relief as Justice requires. (Underl1ning adde for emphasis)
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants
. is.waived if the motion is not made at least five days before
trial.. In ruling on a motion by defendant ·for severance, the·
Court may order th~ prosecutor to disclose any statements made
by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence-at
·
·
the trial.
By joining the two informations.the defendant was prejudiced
by being prevented from consulting with his counsel on the new information
prior to the time of trial and from assisting in the preparation of a
proper defense.

The joinder also effectively prevented the defendant

from engaging in any discovery proceed.i''ngs which are available under
Section 77-35-16, Utah
Although~

Code~Annotated

1953, as amended.

the offenses contained in both information alleged that

·they occurred on the· ·same date, the nature of the defenses are indeed
substantially different and contain different

elements~

Primarily, the

offense of aggravated burglary requires that there be an unlawful entry
or that the ·defendant remain unlawfully on the premises, Section 76-6-202(1)
Utah Code Annotated 195.3, as amended.

By the time defendant 1 s co.unse 1

was aware that the charge of aggravated burglary was .to be joined, witnesses
had already been· called, and it was too late at that point to investigate
and subpoena witnesses with regard to-whether the alleged entry into the
home was illegal or with consent.

The Court should also be aware that the

defendant/ between December 17, _1981 and the date of tri a1 on December 21 ,
198l~was

incarcerated in the Utah State Prison, a.distance of 120 miles
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from his counsel's office and was not reasonably available so that these
issues could be discussed.

The short period of time further prevented

proper association between defendant and his counsel as to how the case
should now be approached and what tactics might need to be changed in
view of the fact that a new offense was being joined which contained
different elements.
·in State v. Mathis, 319 P.2d 134 (Utah 1957) the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah addressed itself·to the need for both sides to have
a fair opportunity to prepare:
The law is, or at least those who devote their lives to it
like to think it is, the embodiment of reason and good sense.
The duty of the court in administering justice carries deeper
responsibilities than presiding over a game of tricks ...
Experience teaches that in the arranging of trials and themarshaling of witnesses, sometimes either the prosecution or
the defense may inadvertently find itself unable safely to
proceed to trial. While diligence in preparation should be
insisted upon, the courts necessarily must be somewhat indulgent of perplexing situations which arise, to the end that
both sides have a fair opportunity to present.their respective
cases . (31 9 P. 2d at l 36 )
Section 77-35-9(d) provides as follows:
• • • a defendant's right to severence of offenses or
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least
five days before trial. 11
11

The above

sta~utory

provision provides that a defendant can make

a motion to severence of offenses if he does it at least five days prior
to the trial.

Yet, in this instance, the prosecution made a motion to

join only four days prior to the time the trial was to commence and there
was an intervening weekend.
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It would seem that the State ought to be prohibited from making
such a motion upon ·only four days notice when a defendant is bound by a
five day notice period.
By way of summary, the aggravated burglary was dismissed by the
Circuit Court on November 9, 1981 and the prosecution did not formally
move to have the matter reheard by the Circuit Court until December 16,
1981, a period of five days-prior to the trial.
-it woula appear that the State could have moved much more quickly
on the new· information had it so desired and not forced the· defendant to
be in the posision of determining four days prior to trial how it was going
to not contend with a new charge which contained different offenses.
- By opposing the Motion for Joi nder defense counsel was in effect

claiming that he did not have sufficient time to prepare for trial.

The

Utah Supreme Court in discussing continuances stated·in State v. Moosman,
542 P.2d. 1093 (1975):
The grant~ng of a continuance of a case is a matter resting
in the sound di~cretion of the trial judge, and that discretion
wi 11 not be interfered with on appea 1 except where. the court
~learly abused its discretion in the matter.
(542 P.2d at 1094)
Defendant asserts that the Court abused its discretion in this
matter by ordering

t~at

the two information be joined in light of

~he

particular circumstances.
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POINT

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FORMALLY ARRAIGN THE
DEFENDANT ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED BURGLARY.
The.Court granted the State's Motion to join· the charge
of Aggravated Burglary with the two counts of Aggravated Assault on
the morning of the first day of the trial.

The Court then proceeded

with the trial without ever arraigning the defendant on the charge of
Aggravated Burglary.

It did not occur to counsel until a recess in

the trial ·that the defendant had not been formally arraigned on the
charge contained in the new information. (T.119)

The Court, in hearing

a Motion for New Trial,_ acknowledged that no formal arraignment had
occurred:
THE COURT: Counsel, I mean--of course, I mean it really
stunned me when I read your brief that there was no formal
arraignment. Of course, I was a visiting Judge at this point
and I had assumed he'd been arraigned on that second count.
You advised me before and I might have even arraigned him
on the first count, I don't remember, but I don't think so,
though, (T. 240)
Section 77-35-lO(a) provides as follows:
Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the
defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court.
Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant
or stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on
him to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to plead.
The language of the above statute appears to be mandatory ·in
nature and requires that a formal arraignment be conducted in open court,
that the information be read to the defendant or that the substance of
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the charge be stated to him, that he be called upon to plead, and
that he be furnished with a copy of the information.

All of the fore-

going were inadvertenely not complied with,-undoubtedly because of the
confusion and time constrairits resulting from the Court's Order for
Joi nder.
The failure to arraign prejudiced the defendant by depriving
him of certain rights which accrue only at or soon after the time of
arraignment, e.g., the right to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint
together with the right to make such motions prior to,trial·as would be
appropriate, including, but not limited to, motion for discovery pursuant
to section 77-35-16. motion for bill of particulars, possible mqtion for
suppression of evidence, and right to request sufficient time to prepare
for trial after arraignment.
Defendant further submits that the arraignment, particularly in
a situtation such as this where a trial is held four days after the pre1iminary hearing,-is a critical stage of the proceedings and should not
be subject to waiver.

In the alternative, if it is a proceeding subject

to waiver, defendant asserts that it is incumbent upon the Court to advise
the defendant of the attendant rights he would be waiving.
should be on the Court- to properly arraign defendant.

The burden

The defendant.

should not be placed in the position of having to request that his rights
supposedly conferred by Section 77-35- lO(a) be afforded him.

To suggest

that the burden should be shifted to the defendant to demand fundamental
rights

~oes

not comport

wit~

due process.

-11-
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POINT

II I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION WOULD BE
PERMITTED TO REBUT DEFENDANT'S ALIBI WITNESSES.
The

defendant~timely

filed with the Court and served on the

prosecuting attorney .his notice of alibi. (Record at p. 13). The State·
filed no list of witnesses whom they intended to call to contradict·or
impeach the defendant's alibi evidence.
Section 77-14-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended provides
as follows:
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been
made, who intends ·to offer evidence of an alibi shall,
not less than ten days before trial or at such other
time as the court may allow, file and serve on the
prosecuting attorney at nottce, in writing, of his
intention to claim alibi. The notice shall contain
specific information as to the place where the defendant
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense
and, as particularly as is known to the defendant or
his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by
whom he proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting
attorney, not more than five days after receipt of the list
provided herein or at such other time as the court may
direct, shall file and serve the defendant with the
addresses, as particularly as are known to him, or the
witnesses the state proposes to offer to contradi~t or
impeach the defendant•s·alibi evidence. (underlining added)

(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under
a continuing duty to disclose the names and addresses of
additional witnesses which come to the attention of either
party after filing their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply
with ·the requirements of this section, the court may exclude
evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi. However, the
·defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning
a 1i bi .

(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this section.
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Counsel for defendant advised the court in chambers that he
intended to call Mrs. LaVon Seely as an alibi witness. (T.169) Counsel
for the State then advised the Court that he wanted to call Officer
Dean Holdaway as a witness to rebut Mrs. Seely even though he had not
complied wHh the statute in furnishing defense· counsel with a- list
of the State's impeachment witnesses.

(T.170).

The court, after

- listening to both sides, decided -that it would permit Officer Holdaway
to rebut Mrs.

Se~ly.(T.172)

Defendant

~ontends

that the trial court's ruling

w~s

an abuse

of discretion in that· the State did not show or demonstrate to the Court
"good cause" to waive the requirements of the statute.

The only reason

given by the State was that they weren t sure Mrs. Seely was the person
11

who made a statement to Officer Holdaway.

It is of utmost importance,

how-ever;' ·tff note that the State received defendant 1 s alibi notice containing Mrs. Seely's name approximately 13-14 days prior to trial.

The

purpose of the notice by defense counsel was to afford the State the
opportunity to· evaluate and prepare for Mrs.

Seely'~

testimony.

The

State could offer- no credible reason to explain its failure to file its
rebuttal witness list.
The Court reasoned as follows;
THE COURT: Counsel, the ···statute .also makes it discretionary·
to the Court based upon the circumstances of the case. My
position is this: This man, this rebuttal witness, is an
officer that has testified both at the Preliminary Hearing
and has heretofore testified to this Court about this matter.
I don't see where that causes any hann under these circumstances.
I mean you would bo~h have had an opportunity to cross-exam~ne
him before about this whole matter. You could have asked him
anything you wanted and I don't see where that falls into

-13-
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this type of category of surprise. Anyway I don't want to
argue about it, that's the ruling so I'm going to allow
that. So, of course, if she's lying, I don't see how
there's a rebuttal situation. (T.172)
The Court in its reasoning, however, fails to take into consideration the :fact that defense counsel did not know at the Preliminary
Hearing that the officer had any information to rebut the contention of
Mrs. Seely.

Defense counsel would have had no reason to cross-examine

·Officer Holdaway on that issue at Preliminary Hearing.
Mrs. Seely's testimony would have been that she was sleeping
in the living room of the Peterson home when the defendant arrived home,
that she saw him come in the ftont door and go to the kitchen and then
go to his bedroom. (T. 169)

The ruling of the Court permitting the

officer to rebut her testimony at the 1ast moment caused a chi 11 i ng effect
on her and she did not testify.

The practical result was that the

defendant was deprived of a witness who would corroborate the alibi
testimony of Mr. Charles Peterson.
In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37L.Ed2d 82(1973)
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
enforcement of "alibi rules unles reciprocal rights are given to criminal
defendants' (412 U.S. at 472, 93 S.Ct. at 2211)

The Utah Supreme Court

in Gentry v. Smith, 600 P.2_d 1008(1979) emphasized the fact:
• • • the State may not insist that trials be run as a
'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned,
while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses."
11

See also State v. Haddenham 585 P.2d 447 (1978) and State v.
Case 547 P. 2d 221 (1976)
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POINT

IV

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT S MOTION . . FOR
1

NEW TRIAL UPON THE GROUNDS THAT THE STATE ASKED A WITNESS AN IMPROPER
QUESTION.
Counsel for .Defendant called Evan Reid as a witness on behalf·
of the defendant.
twice,

11

On cross-examination the prosecutor asked.'the question

Are you Bryon Peterson 1 s parole offi cer 11 • (T. 161 , 180).

The

State continued to pursue Mr. Reid's employment and was finally told by
the Court ·to not get into that area. (T. 181).
The quest.ton propounded by the State is by its very nature
"loaded" and· impl i.es-:that the defendant has been convicted of a crime~
. Evidence of the defendant's conviction of a crime is not
admissible at trial unless the defendant'himself takes the witness stand
and responds to the quest ion, .11 Have you been convicted of a fe l ony? 11
Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Evidence.of the conviction of a witness for a crime
not i nvo l vi ng :dishonesty or false statement s ha 11 be
inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his credibility ...
The- defendant in.,.this case did not take the witness stand for
the reason that he had been previously convicted of a felony.

Neverthe-

1es·s, the prosecution deliberately attempted to circumvent the defendant s
1

rights in this regard by propounding the question Are you the defendant's
11

parole officer?''
....··~ ',

Certainly such a question carries significant weight

.

with the jury and unduly influences their minds and prejudices them against
the defendant.

Additionally, there wasno method of undoing the damage

done by the Prosecutor s question. ·""'· · ·
1
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Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial and cited the above
impropriety as a cause for new trial. (Record at P. 108) · Th&motion
was denied by the Court.(T.254)
The instant case is distinguishable from State v. Case,

547

P.2d 221 (1976) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that reference in
the testimony to the Fact that defendant had been incarcerated fo the
Utah State Prison -was not ground for a mis tri a1 .

In Case the reference

to the prison was the result of an unintentional slip of the tongue
whereas the question prosed inthe present c_a_s_ewas a deliberate and
intentional attempt to discredit the defendant's character when it
wasn't in issue.
Section 77-35-24(a) Utah Gode Annotated 1953,. as amended
states:
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own ~
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
Defendant suggests that the question propounded falls into
the category of improprieties contemplated by the statute.

Certainly

it had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the defendant
POINT

V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE BURGLARY AND ASSAULTS WERE ijQT
AGGRAVATED.
Immediately after the prosecution rested its case the defense
moved the Court to strike the word "aggravated" from each of the three
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counts contained in the Information. (T. 116)
Motion. (T. 119)

The Court denied the

The jury returned a verdict of guilty to Aggravated

Burglary and Aggravated Assault on Sandra Dotson and guilty of Assault
(without the 11 Aggravated 11 ) on Tammy Dotson.

Accordingly, this Appeal

speaks only to verdicts of guilty to Aggravated Burglary and one count·
of Aggravated Assault on Sandra Dotson.
Section 76-5-103 defines Aggravated Assault as follows:
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and:
(a) He in-tentionally·causes serious bodily injury to
another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means of force likely
to produce death or serious bodily injury.
The phrase "serious bodily injury" is defined in Section
76-1-601:
(9) "Serious bodily inJury 11 means bodily injury· that creates
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss
6r impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ
or creates a substantial risk of death.
The testimony of Sandra Dotson makes it clear th~t she did not
suffer any\serious bodily injury.

She did not require any

m~dical

attention after the assault· and refused to go to the hospital. (T. 31,
-

38, 39)

Sandra also make no claim that any kind of a deadly weapon was
There is also no evid~nce that she suffered any permanent dis-

used.

figurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, nor did her bodily injury create a substantial risk of
death.
In State of Utah in the Interest of William N. Besendorfer, 568
P.2d

742(1977·-uta~)

the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the defendants
-17-
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contention that an aggravated assault. had not been committed where the
victim had been kicked in the legs, struck in the face several times by
a fist and required ·dental attention for

hi~ teeth~

The record in the instant case does not reveal that·Sandra
Dotson received any injuries which were more serious than that sustained
by the victim ·in Besendorfer. The record is also void Of direct evidence
which would show the defendant used force or means likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.
Addressing now the issue of whether an Aggravated Burglary was
committed, defendant contends it was not as a matter of law in that
"physical injury", as contemplated by Section 76-6-203(1 )(a) was not
committed.

Aggravated Burglary is defined by that section as follows:

A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting,
committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the actor or another
pa-rticipant in the crime:
(a) causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime; or
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
or deadly weapon against any person who is not a participant
in the crime; or
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or possesses or
attempts to use any explosive or deadly weapon.
The phrase

11

physical i njury

11

is not defined in the Utah

Criminal Code and defendant submits that the small bruises and cuts
sustained by Sandra and Tammy Dotson were not sufficient in magnitude
to constitute the type of physical injury" contemplated by the statute.
11

The term. physical injury" is sufficiently vague so as to make it unclear
11

as to the degree of seriousness of injury deemed necessary by the
legislature to constitute Aggravated Burglary.

Accordingly, defendant

also contends the statute is void for vagueness.
-18-
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POINT VI
THE IMPOSITION OF A $10,000.00 FINE WAS EXCESSIVE AND AN
ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION
For the offense of Aggravated Burglary the Court imposed a
prison term from 5 years to life with a $10,000 fine.

Defendant

contends that the amount of the fine, although within the statutory·
parameters, was excessive under the circumstances and disproportionate
to the offense conmi.tted.
In State vs. Nance, 438 P.2d 542(1968), the Utah

S~preme

Court discussed whether the length of a prison sentence was excessive
or cruel and unusual but it would appear that the test therein set forth
would be applicable to fines as well:
"Our inquiry is limited to the question of whether the
sentence imposed in proportion to ·the offense committed
is such as to shuck the moral sense of all reasonable men
as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.
438 P.2d at 544.
See also.State v. Teague, 336, P.2d 338, 340 (1959)
The circumstances here show that neither of the victims of the
assault or the Burglary incurred any permanent injuries or disfigurement
nor did ei th.er of them require any medi ca 1 attentton or incur medical
expenses.

The defendant is deprived of hiS liberty for 5 years to life

as well as suffering other disabilities imposed by law upon a convicted
felon.

The defendant is· impecunious as he qua 1i fi ed for appointed counsel

at trial and on appeal.
expected to pay the fine.

He has no means by which he can reasonably be
In this sense, ,the Trial Court has imposed a

condition on the defendant which borders on the edge of impossible to
-19-
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perform and therefore shocks the moral sense.

Defendant submits that

there is a point of diminishing returns in sentencing and that the fine
imposed will not accomplish any purpose which the

~rison

sentence will not.

POINT VI I
THE VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant 1 s theory of defense at trial was that the person who
·entered the home of Sandra and Tammy Dotson on September 1, 1981 was
someone other than the defendant • .- It is the contention of defendant that
the jury_ verdict p1acing hi.m. in the home was in error and is not supported
by the evidence given at trial.·
Sandra Dotson, Tammy Dotson, and Edward McKinney all testified
that the defendant was the assailant. (T. 18, 46, 91) Consider, however
the evidence produced by defendant. that showed he ::was n_ot at the Dotson home
at the time Of the offense.
(a)

Defe~dant's

father produced and entered into evidence the

page from his diary for September 1, 1981 which reflects that the defendant
arrived home at 5:30 A.N.
(b) The license number of the van seen leaving the Dotson
residence was NV 5500 while the van of the defendant bore the license
number NV 5301. (T. 71, 73, 74)
(c) The assailant had a beard of about 1 1/2 months growth.
(T. 91) However, the defendant approximately 30 minutes after the assault
took place had no beard.

See Exhibit No. 12 and also the testimony of

Officer Holdaway at p. 128 of Transcript.
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(d) Marilyn McKinney stated that the van which drove away
from the Dotson home had a yellow front fender on the driver's side.
(T. 174) Exhibits No .. 2 and 3 (photos of defendant 1 s van) .show that

the defendant's van does

no~

have a yellow front fender.

(e) Sandy Dotson testified that she scratched_the assailant.:·
(T.18) but Officer Holdaway said that he saw the defendant in the hude
at 7:00 A.M. that morning but rroticed no scratches or bruises on him.
(T. BT)

-(f) Sandra Dotson did not notice the odor of alcohbl on the
assailant although he at times was sitting on her. (T.37)
however;~:

The defendant

had consumed approximately l 1/2 fifths of .whiskey in the. ·hours
1

shortly before the assault and obviously would·have had an odor of an
alcoholic beverage about him. (T.134).
It is also significant to note that the identifications made
by the three witnesses at the Dotson home were made in almost dark
conditions and Ed McKinney and Tammy Dotson _,h(ld only seen the defendant
on one
·suspect

earli~r

occasion.

fo~the-

. .•::,•.

The testimony of Sandra Dotson is naturally

reason that she first thought the assailant was her

boyfirend, Joe Gross, and then thought it might be her ex-husband,
vJa 1ter ·Dotson.

Her credi bi 1i ty is further weakened by the fact that she

was taking prescription medications, e.g. Percodan, Valium, and Dalimane
on the night of the incident. (T.35)
Defendant contends that the verdict of the jury is not supported
by the evidence in light of.the above.
is

clo~ded

The

testimon~

of the three witnesses

with cbnsiderable difficulties affecting its weight whereas
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that produced by the defendant is convincing that he was not present in
the Dotson house when the attack occured.
POINT VI II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO· AMEND THE
INFORMATION AFTER IT HAD RESTED ITS CASE.
On the

morni~g

of the second day of trial and after the State

· had rested the State moved the Court to amend the Information to state
that in committing Aggravated Assault the defendant used

11

~uch

means

or force ·1 ikely to produce death or serious bodily injury." (T.166)
Defendant's objection (T. 166) ·was overruled and the motion was granted.
(T. 167)
Permitting the Infonnation to be amended on the last day of
trial prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.

Section

77-35-4(d) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended provides:
The Court may permit an indictment or information
to be am~nded at any time before verdict if no additional
or different offense is charged and the substantial rights
of the defendant are not prejudiced.
Defendant acknowledges that no additional or different offense
was charged by the a.mendment, but alleges that his substantial rights
were prejudiced.

The defendant came to trial prepared to defend against

the claim that· he had caused "serious bodily injury 11 to Sandra Dotson
and Tammy Dotson under subparagraph (a) of 76-5-103.

The defendant did

not come to trial prepared to defend against a claim that he used
11

means or force likely to Pt:'Oduce death" under subparagraph (b)
-22-
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of Section 76-5-103.

By granting the State's Motion the burden was

then placed on counsel to quickly obtain a medical expert· who could
testify as to whether the conduct of the assailant presented a risk of
causing death to the victim.
- Counsel and defendant had previously gone through a Preliminary _
Hearing in which no attempt to show or claim-was.made that the means of
force used were likely to produce death.

Counsel

~should

have been

justified in relying upon the allegations contained in the Information
on·which defendant wasbound,ov-er.

It is not reasonable to.expect the

defendant to come to trial· armed _.with witnesses to rebut and defend
against possible new allegations o.r elements in the _offenses charged.
Counse 1 cannot reasonably be expected to anti ci pate the .amendments
which might be made by the State.

The Trial Court by granting the

Statejs motion placed a burden on defendant which was not anticipated
and which deprived the defendant of his substantial rights.

CONCLUSION
The cumulative.effect of the errors and improprieties-committed
at trial would justify this Honorable Court in reversing the verdict and
judgment and the cause should be remanded back to the Trial Court for
a new tri a1 for the reasons set forth in the precedin-g, points.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryner
690 E t Main Street
P.O. Box 444
Price, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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